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F or three decades, the debate about rising income inequality in the United States has centered on the dispersion of wages and the increased premium for skilled/educated workers, attributed in varying proportions to skill-
biased technological change and to globalization (for example, see Katz and Autor 
1999 for a survey). In recent years, however, there has been a growing realization 
that most of the action has been at the very top. This has attracted a great deal of 
public attention (as witnessed by the number of visits to and press citations of our 
World Top Incomes Database at http://topincomes.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/) 
and has represented a challenge to the economics profession. Stories based on the 
supply and demand for skills are not enough to explain the extreme top tail of 
the earnings distribution; nor is it enough to look only at earned incomes. Different 
approaches are necessary to explain what has happened in the United States over 
the past century and also to explain the differing experience in other high-income 
countries over recent decades. We begin with the international comparison in the 
fi rst section and then turn to the causes and implications of the evolution of top 
income shares.
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We should start by emphasizing the factual importance of the top 1 percent. 
It is tempting to dismiss the study of this group as a passing political fad due to 
the slogans of the Occupy movement or as the academic equivalent of reality 
TV. But the magnitudes are truly substantial. Based on pre-tax and pre-transfer 
market income (excluding nontaxable fringe benefi ts such as health insurance 
but including realized capital gains) per family reported on tax returns, the share 
of total annual income received by the top 1 percent has more than doubled from 
9 percent in 1976 to 20 percent in 2011 (Piketty and Saez, 2003, and the World 
Top Incomes Database). There have been rises for other top shares, but these 
have been much smaller: during the same period, the share of the group from 
95th to 99th percentile rose only by 3 percentage points. The rise in the share of 
the top 1 percent has had a noticeable effect on overall income inequality in the 
United States (Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2011, Section 2.2).
The United States Top 1 Percent in International Perspective
Figure 1 depicts the US top 1 percent income share since 1913. Simon Kuznets 
(1955) famously hypothesized that economic growth would fi rst be accompanied by 
a rise in inequality and then by a decline in inequality. At fi rst glance, it is tempting 
Figure 1
Top 1 Percent Income Share in the United States
Source: Source is Piketty and Saez (2003) and the World Top Incomes Database.
Notes: The fi gure reports the share of total income earned by top 1 percent families in the United States 
from 1913 to 2011. Income is defi ned as pre-tax market income; it excludes government transfers and 
nontaxable fringe benefi ts. The fi gure reports series including realized capital gains (solid squares) 
and series excluding realized capital gains (hollow squares).
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to conclude from Figure 1 that the Kuznets curve has been turned upside-down. But 
this suggestion is too facile. After all, the interwar period did not exhibit a secular 
downward trend in shares of top incomes. Apart from the bubble of the late 1920s, 
the US top 1 percent share was between 15 and 20 percent throughout this time. 
At the time of Pearl Harbor in 1941, the share of the top 1 percent was essentially 
the same as in 1918. The downward trend in top shares started at the time of World 
War II and continued until the end of the 1960s. There was then a sharp reversal 
such that the top share is today back in the same range as in the 1920s. Interest-
ingly, the Great Recession of 2008 –2009 does not seem to have reversed the upward 
trend. There was a fall in the top 1 percent share in 2008 –2009 but a rebound in 
2010. This would be consistent with the experience of the previous economic down-
turn: top income shares fell in 2001–2002 but quickly recovered and returned to the 
previous trend in 2003 –2007. Another piece of evidence that is consistent with this 
interpretation is the smaller cyclical variation in the series excluding capital gains 
(shown by the hollow squares in Figure 1).
Has the US experience been reproduced in other high-income countries? 
The evolution of the shares of the top 1 percent is shown for four Anglo-Saxon 
countries in Figure 2A and for France, Germany, Sweden, and Japan in Figure 2B 
(it should be noted that the estimates for France and the United Kingdom do 
not include capital gains, the estimates for Canada, Germany, Japan, and Sweden 
include realized capital gains after the year therein shown, and the estimates 
for Australia include them only partially and at varying degrees over time). The 
other Anglo-Saxon countries—Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom—all 
show a strong asymmetric U-shape. However, the rises were less marked in two 
of these countries. Over the period 1980 to 2007, when the top 1 percent share 
rose by some 135 percent in the United States and the United Kingdom, it rose 
by some 105 percent in Australia and 76 percent in Canada (and by 39 percent 
in New Zealand, not shown). The experience is markedly different in continental 
Europe and Japan, where the long pattern of income inequality is much closer to 
an L-shaped than a U-shaped curve. (Sweden and other Scandinavian countries 
such as Norway (not shown) are intermediate cases.)1 There has been some rise in 
recent years in the top shares in these countries, but the top 1 percent shares are 
not far today from their levels in the late 1940s, whereas in the United States the 
share of the top 1 percent is higher by more than a half.
To us, the fact that high-income countries with similar technological and 
productivity developments have gone through different patterns of income 
inequality at the very top supports the view that institutional and policy differences 
play a key role in these transformations. Purely technological stories based solely 
upon supply and demand of skills can hardly explain such diverging patterns. What 
is more, within countries, we have to explain not only why top shares rose (in the 
U-shaped countries) but also why they fell for a sustained period of time earlier in 
1 The Swedish top 1 percent share was very high during World War I. The same is observed in Denmark—
see the discussion in Atkinson and Søgaard (2013).
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Figure 2
The Evolution of the Shares of the Top 1 Percent in Different Countries
Source: The World Top Incomes Database.
Notes: The fi gure reports the share of total income earned by the top 1 percent in four English-speaking 
countries in panel  A, and in four  other OECD countries ( Japan and three continental European 
countries) in panel B. Income is defi ned as pre-tax market income. The estimates for Australia include 
realized capital gains partially and at varying degrees over time.
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the twentieth century. The most obvious policy difference—between countries and 
over time—regards taxation, and it is here that we begin.
Taxes and Top Shares
During the twentieth century, top income tax rates have followed an inverse 
U-shaped time-path in many countries, as illustrated in Figure  3. In the United 
States, top income tax rates were consistently above 60 percent from 1932 to 1981, 
and at the start of the 1920s, they were above 70 percent (of course, varying propor-
tions of taxpayers were subject to the top rate). High income tax rates are not just 
a feature of the post-World War II period, and their cumulative effect contributed 
to the earlier decline in top income shares. While many countries have cut top 
tax rates in recent decades, the depth of these cuts has varied considerably. For 
example, the top tax rate in France in 2010 was only 10 percentage points lower 
than in 1950, whereas the top tax rate in the US was less than half its 1950 value.
Figure  4 plots the changes in top marginal income tax rates (combining 
both central and local government income taxes) since the early 1960s against 
the changes over that period in top 1 percent income shares for 18 high-income 
countries in the World Top Incomes Database. It shows that there is a strong corre-
lation between the reductions in top tax rates and the increases in top 1 percent 
Figure 3
Top Marginal Income Tax Rates, 1900 – 2011
Source: Piketty and Saez (2013, fi gure 1).
Notes: The fi gure depicts the top marginal individual income tax rate in the United States, United 
Kingdom, France, and Germany since 1900. The tax rate includes only the top statutory individual 
income tax rate applying to ordinary income with no tax preference. State income taxes are not included 
in the case of the United States. For France, we include both the progressive individual income tax and 
the ﬂat rate tax “Contribution Sociale Generalisée.”
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pre-tax income shares. For example, the United States experienced a reduction 
of 47  percentage points in its top income tax rate and a 10  percentage point 
increase in its top 1  percent pre-tax income share. By contrast, countries such 
as Germany, Spain, or Switzerland, which did not experience any signifi cant top 
rate tax cut, did not show increases in top 1 percent income shares. Hence, the 
evolution of top tax rates is strongly negatively correlated with changes in pre-tax 
income concentration.
This negative correlation can be explained in a variety of ways. As pointed out 
originally by Slemrod (1996), it is possible that the rise in top US income shares 
occurred because, when top tax rates declined, those with high incomes had less 
Figure 4
Changes in Top Income Shares and Top Marginal Income Tax Rates since 1960
(combining both central and local government income taxes)
Source: Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2011, revised October  2012, fi gure  3). Source for top income 
shares is the World Top Incomes Database. Source for top income tax rates is OECD and country-
specifi c sources.
Notes: The fi gure depicts the change in the top 1 percent income share against the change in the top 
income tax rate from 1960– 64 to 2005–2009 for 18  OECD countries. If the country does not have 
top  income share data for those years, we select the fi rst available fi ve years after 1960 and the most 
recent 5 years. For the following fi ve countries, the data start after 1960: Denmark (1980), Ireland (1975), 
Italy (1974), Portugal (1976), Spain (1981). For Switzerland, the data end in 1995 (they end in 2005 or 
after for all the other countries). Top tax rates include both the central and local government top tax 
rates. The correlation between those changes is very strong. The elasticity estimates of the ordinary least 
squares regression of log(top 1% share) on log(1 – MTR) based on the depicted dots is 0.47 (0.11).
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reason to seek out tax avoidance strategies. This argument has more recently been 
used to deny that any real increase in income concentration actually took place—
that it is a pure statistical artifact. Under this scenario, the real US top income shares 
were as high in the 1960s as they are today, but a smaller fraction of top incomes 
was reported on tax returns. While this factor may have affected the pattern of the 
data at certain times—for example, the jump in top US income shares following 
the 1986 Tax Reform Act—closer examination of the US case suggests that the tax 
avoidance response cannot account for a signifi cant fraction of the long-run surge 
in top incomes. Top income shares based on a broader defi nition of income that 
includes realized capital gains, and hence a major portion of avoidance channels, 
have increased virtually as much as top income shares based on a narrower defi ni-
tion of income subject to the progressive tax schedule (see Figure 1 and Piketty, 
Saez, and Stantcheva 2011 for a detailed analysis).
The explanation that changes in tax rates in the top tax brackets do lead to 
substantive behavioral change has indeed received some support. After noting that 
top US incomes surged following the large top marginal tax rate cuts of the 1980s, 
Lindsey (1987) and Feldstein (1995) proposed a standard supply-side story whereby 
lower tax rates stimulate economic activity among top earners involving more work, 
greater entrepreneurship, and the like. In this scenario, lower top tax rates would 
lead to more economic activity by the rich and hence more economic growth.
Behavioral change is at the heart of the optimal income tax analysis pioneered 
by Mirrlees (1971) and publicly evoked in the debate about top tax rates in the 
UK, where the Chancellor of the Exchequer has argued that reducing the top tax 
rate below 50  percent (for broadly the top 1  percent) will not reduce revenue. 
The standard optimal tax formula (Diamond and Saez 2011) implies, with an elas-
ticity of taxable income of 0.5, that the revenue-maximizing top tax rate would be 
57 percent.2 When allowance is made for other taxes levied in the United Kingdom, 
such as the payroll tax, this implies a top income tax rate in the United Kingdom of 
some 40 percent (Atkinson 2012).
Richer Models of Pay Determination
The optimal tax literature has, however, remained rooted in an oversimpli-
fi ed model of pay determination that takes no account of developments in labor 
economics, and the same applies to the explanations of changing top income 
shares. Changes in the pay of a worker are assumed to have no impact on either 
the other side of the labor market or on other workers. The worker generates more 
output and pay adjusts by the same amount. Each person is an island. However, in 
the now-standard models of job-matching, a job emerges as the result of the costly 
creation of a vacancy by the employer and of job search by the employee. A match 
2 The revenue-maximizing top tax rate formula takes the form τ = 1/(1 + a · e) where a is the Pareto 
parameter of the top tail of the income distribution, and e is the elasticity of pre-tax income with respect 
to the net-of-tax rate 1 – τ. With e = 0.5 (as estimated from Figure 4) and a = 1.5 (the current Pareto 
parameter of the US income distribution), we get τ = 1/(1 + 0.5 · 1.5) = 57 percent.
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creates a positive surplus, and there is Nash bargaining over the division of the 
surplus, leading to a proportion β going to the worker and (1 – β ) to the employer. 
Typically, β is assumed fi xed, but it is possible that what we have observed, at least at 
the top, is an increase in β, which can lead to changes in the distribution of income.3
Why should β have increased? The extent to which top earners exercised 
bargaining power may have interacted with the changes in the tax system. When 
top marginal tax rates were very high, the net reward to a highly paid executive for 
bargaining for more compensation was modest. When top marginal tax rates fell, 
high earners started bargaining more aggressively to increase their compensation. 
In this scenario, cuts in top tax rates can increase top income shares—consistent 
with the observed trend in Figure 1—but the increases in top 1 percent incomes 
now come at the expense of the remaining 99 percent.
One can also weave this notion of greater incentives for bargaining into a 
broader scenario, in which the improved information and communications tech-
nology and globalization were increasing the demand for high-skilled labor, and the 
deregulation of fi nance and of other industries was both raising the demand for skill 
at the top and changing the rules under which compensation had been calculated 
in the past. In this perspective, high marginal tax rates had served as a brake on the 
level of surplus extraction in the past, but then this brake was released at the same 
time that economic and institutional conditions allowed for higher compensation 
at the top of the income distribution (Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva 2011).
In this scenario, the higher share of income going to the top 1 percent does 
not refl ect higher economic growth—which is a key difference with the supply-
side scenario. It is even possible that reductions in top marginal tax rates may 
have adverse effects on growth, as may be seen if we go back to the theories of 
managerial fi rms and the separation of ownership and control developed by 
Oliver E. Williamson, William Baumol, and Robin Marris in the 1960s and 1970s 
(for discussion, see Solow 1971). In these models, managers are concerned with 
their remuneration (both monetary and nonmonetary) but also with other dimen-
sions such as the scale or rate of growth of their fi rms, and allocate their effort 
accordingly. Where top tax rates were high, there was a low return to effort spent 
on negotiating higher pay. Top corporate executives may have concentrated on 
securing alternative sources of utility, such as unproductive corporate expenses, 
but they may also have ploughed back profi ts into securing faster expansion than 
in the traditional stock market valuation-maximizing fi rm. Cuts in top tax rates, 
however, meant that top executives switched efforts back to securing a larger share 
of the profi ts, in which case increases in remuneration, or bonuses, may have come 
at the expense of employment and growth.
The correlation shown in Figure 4 between top marginal tax rates and changes in 
top income shares may of course refl ect in part coincidence rather than causality. The 
political factors that led to top tax rate cuts —such as those by Reagan and Thatcher 
3 Kleven, Landais, Saez, and Schultz (2013) fi nd evidence of such bargaining effects in the pay determi-
nation of high earners, using the Danish preferential tax scheme for highly paid immigrants.
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in the 1980s in the United States and the United Kingdom—were accompanied by 
other legislative changes, such as deregulation, which may have caused top incomes 
to rise, not least on account of the impetus they gave to the growth of the fi nancial 
services (Philippon and Reshef 2012) and legal services sectors. More generally, the 
effects of taxation may interact with other changes, such as those in remuneration 
practices. Where there is a surplus to be shared, the division may refl ect relative 
bargaining strength, as above, but it may also be infl uenced by social norms. Notions 
of fairness, or a “pay code,” may come into play to remove the indeterminacy where 
“individual incentives are not by themselves . . . suffi cient to determine a unique 
equilibrium” (MacLeod and Malcomson 1998, p. 400). A “pay code” limits the extent 
to which earnings are individually determined, a situation that both workers and 
employers accept on reputational grounds. As argued in Atkinson (2008), there may 
be a tipping-point where there is a switch from a high level of adherence to such 
a code to a situation where pay becomes largely individually determined. This has 
been documented in the case of the United States by Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent 
(2009), who fi nd an increase in the proportion of performance-pay jobs over the 
period 1976 to 1998. As they note, the increased extent of performance-pay may be 
a channel by which other factors are expressed in greater wage dispersion, and they 
stress the effect at the top end of the wage distribution.
Top Tax Rates and Growth
If we look at the aggregate outcomes, we fi nd no apparent correlation between 
cuts in top tax rates and growth rates in real per capita GDP (Piketty, Saez, and 
Stantcheva 2011). Countries that made large cuts in top tax rates such as the United 
Kingdom or the United States have not grown signifi cantly faster than countries that 
did not, such as Germany or Switzerland. This lack of correlation is more consistent 
with a story that the response of pre-tax top incomes to top tax rates documented in 
Figure 4 is due to increased bargaining power or more individualized pay at the top, 
rather than increased productive effort. Naturally, cross-country comparisons are 
bound to be fragile; exact results vary with the specifi cation, years, and countries. 
However, the regression analysis by Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2011), using the 
complete time-series data since 1960, shows that the absence of correlation between 
economic growth and top tax rates is quite robust. By and large, the bottom line is 
that rich countries have all grown at roughly the same rate over the past 40 years—in 
spite of huge variations in tax policies.
More specifi cally, international evidence shows that current pay levels for chief 
executive offi cers across countries are strongly negatively correlated with top tax 
rates even controlling for fi rm’s characteristics and performance, and that this 
correlation is stronger in fi rms with poor governance (Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva 
2011).4 This fi nding also suggests that the link between top tax rates and pay of chief 
4 Governance is measured with an index that combines various governance measures: insider ownership, 
institutional ownership, the ratio of independent board directors, whether the CEO is also chairman of 
the board, and the average number of board positions held by board members.
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executive offi cers does not run through fi rm performance but is likely to be due to 
bargaining effects.
Such fi ndings have strong implications for top tax rate policies. The optimal 
top tax rate rises dramatically if a substantial fraction of the effect of top tax rates 
on pre-tax top incomes documented in Figure 4 above is due to wage-bargaining 
effects instead of supply-side effects. Using mid-range parameter values where 
the response of top earners to top tax rate cuts is three-fi fths due to increased 
bargaining behavior and two-fi fths due to increased productive work, Piketty, Saez, 
and Stantcheva (2011) fi nd that the top tax rate could potentially be set as high as 
83 percent—as opposed to 57 percent in the pure supply-side model.5
Capital Income and Inheritance
The analysis just cited focused—like much of the literature— on what is 
commonly called “earned incomes,” referring to income received in return for work. 
But capital income is also an important part of the story. Of course, the distinction 
between the two types of income can become blurry in some cases—notably, entre-
preneurial income can have elements of both compensation for work and a return 
to capital investment. Here, we defi ne “capital income” as rents, dividends, interest, 
and realized capital gains. The decline of top capital incomes is the main driver of 
the falls in top income shares that occurred in many countries early in the twentieth 
century. For example, from 1916 to 1939, capital income represented 50 percent of 
US top 1 percent incomes, whereas by the end of the century from 1987 to 2010, 
the share had fallen to one-third (Piketty and Saez 2003, tables A7 and A8). In the 
United Kingdom, the corresponding share fell from 60 percent in 1937 to under 
20  percent by the end of the century (Atkinson 2007, fi gure  4.11). At the same 
time, it should be borne in mind that these calculations depend on the defi nition of 
taxable incomes. In times past, a number of income tax systems like those in France 
and the United Kingdom included imputed rents of homeowners in the income tax 
base, but today imputed rents are typically excluded. Where the tax base has been 
extended, this has in some cases taken the form of separate taxation (as with real-
ized capital gains in the United Kingdom), so that this element of capital income 
is not covered in the income tax data. As a result of these developments, the share 
of capital income that is reportable on income tax returns has often signifi cantly 
decreased over time.
Earlier we referred to the cumulative effect of progressive taxation. A long 
period of high top rates of income taxation, coupled with high top rates of taxation 
on the transmission of wealth by inheritance and gift, reduced the capacity of large 
5 With wage-bargaining effects, the optimal top tax rate formula becomes τ = (1 + s · a · e)/(1 + a · e) 
where s is the fraction of the total behavioral elasticity due to bargaining effects. With a = 1.5, e = 0.5 
(as  above), and s = 3/5, we obtain τ = 83 percent. In the standard model with no wage-bargaining 
effects, we had s = 0 and τ = 57 percent.
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wealth-holders to sustain their preeminence. The key factor in determining the 
capacity to transmit wealth is the difference between the “internal rate of accumula-
tion” (the savings rate times the rate of return net of taxes) and the rate of growth 
of the economy. This means that the taxation of income and wealth transfers can 
cause the share of top wealth-holders to fall, as in the United Kingdom over the fi rst 
three-quarters of the twentieth century (Atkinson and Harrison 1978), contributing 
to the downward trajectory of top income shares. Alongside this was the growth 
of “popular wealth” owned by the bottom 99 percent. Back in 1908 in the United 
Kingdom, the 17th Earl of Derby had a rent roll of some £100,000, which was more 
than 1,000  times the average income at the time. Many of these houses are now 
owned by their occupiers.
In recent decades, however, the relation between the internal rate of accumula-
tion of wealth holdings and the rate of growth of capital has now been reversed as a 
result of the cuts in capital taxation and the decline in the macroeconomic growth 
rate (Piketty 2011). As a result, a number of countries are witnessing a return of 
inheritance as a major factor. Figure 5 shows the estimates of Piketty (2011) for 
France for the period 1820 to 2008 of the annual inheritance fl ow (the amount 
passed on through bequests and gifts inter vivos), expressed as percentage of 
Figure 5
Annual Inheritance Flow as a Fraction of Disposable Income, France 1820 –2008
Source: Piketty (2011).
Notes: The annual inheritance fl ow is defi ned as the total market value of all assets (tangible and fi nancial 
assets, net of fi nancial liabilities) transmitted at death or through inter vivos gifts. Disposable income was 
as high as 90–95 percent of national income during the 19th century and early 20th century (when taxes 
and transfers were almost nonexistent), while it is now about 70 percent of national income.
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disposable income.6 Two methods are employed: a constructive calculation from 
national wealth fi gures, mortality rates, and observed age-wealth profi les, and an 
estimate based on the estate and gift tax records. The two methods differ in levels 
(the fi scal fl ows are lower), but the time-paths are very similar.
The inheritance fl ow in France was relatively stable around 20–25  percent 
of disposable income throughout the 1820 –1910 period (with a slight upward 
trend), before being divided by a factor of about 5 to 6 between 1910 and the 
1950s. Since then, it has been rising regularly, with an acceleration of the trend 
during the past 30 years. These truly enormous historical variations bring France 
back to a situation similar to that of 100 years ago. An annual inheritance fl ow 
around 20 percent of disposable income is very large. It is typically much larger 
than the annual fl ow of new savings and almost as big as the annual fl ow of 
capital income. This implies that inheritance is again becoming a very important 
factor of lifetime economic inequality. As shown in Piketty and Saez (2012), in a 
world where inheritance is quantitatively signifi cant, those receiving no bequests 
will leave smaller-than-average bequests themselves and hence should support 
shifting labor taxation toward bequest taxation. In this situation, inheritance taxa-
tion (and more generally capital taxation, given capital market imperfections) 
becomes a powerful and desirable tool for redistribution toward those receiving 
no inheritance.
The return of inherited wealth may well differ in magnitude across coun-
tries. The historical series available so far regarding the inheritance fl ows are 
too scarce to reach fi rm conclusions. Existing estimates suggest that the French 
U-shaped pattern also applies to Germany, and to a lesser extent to the United 
Kingdom and the United States (Atkinson 2013; Schinke 2012; see Piketty and 
Zucman, forthcoming, for a survey). Such variations could be due to differences 
in pension systems and the share of private wealth that is annuitized (and there-
fore nontransmissible). From a theoretical perspective, it is unclear however why 
there should be much crowding out between lifecycle wealth and transmissible 
wealth in an open economy (that is, the fact that individuals save more for their 
pension should not make them save less for their children; the extra pension 
wealth coming from the lifecycle motive should be invested abroad). It could 
be that there are differences in tastes for wealth transmission. Maybe wealthy 
individuals in the United Kingdom and in the United States have less taste for 
bequest than their French and German counterparts. However it should be kept 
in mind that there are important data problems (in particular, wealth surveys tend 
to vastly underestimate inheritance receipts), which could partly explain why the 
rise of inheritance fl ows in the recent period appears to be more limited in some 
6 It is critical to include both bequests (wealth transmitted at death) and gifts (wealth transmitted inter 
vivos) in our defi nition of inheritance, fi rst because gifts have always represented a large fraction of total 
wealth transmission, and second because this fraction has changed a lot over time.
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countries than in others.7 Another source of difference between countries could 
come from variations in the total magnitude of wealth accumulation. There may 
in this respect be an important difference between the United States and Europe, 
as is indeed suggested when we look at total private wealth (expressed as a ratio to 
national income), shown in Figure 6 (see Piketty and Zucman, 2013, for a discus-
sion on the differences between private and national wealth).
As may be seen from Figure  6, the twentieth century has seen a U-shaped 
time-path in the ratio of private wealth to national income that is more marked in 
Europe than in the United States. Private wealth in Europe was around six times 
7 In particular, the smaller rise of the UK inheritance fl ow (as compared to France and Germany) is entirely 
due to the much smaller rise of recorded inter vivos gifts, which according to fi scal data barely rose in the 
United Kingdom during recent decades, while they have become almost as large as bequests in France and 
Germany. This might simply be due to the fact that gifts are not properly recorded by the UK tax adminis-
tration (Atkinson 2013). In the United States, due to the limitations of federal fi scal data on bequests and 
gifts, scholars often use retrospective wealth survey data. The problem is that in countries with exhaustive 
administrative data on bequests and gifts (such as France, and to some extent Germany), survey-based 
self-reported fl ows appear to be less than 50 percent of fi scal fl ows. This probably contributes to explaining 
the low level of inheritance receipts found in a number of US studies. An example of such a study is Wolff 
and Gittleman (2011); one additional bias in this study is that inherited assets are valued using asset prices 
at the time these assets were transmitted, and no capital gain or income is included.
Figure 6
Private Wealth/National Income Ratios, 1870 – 2010
Source: Piketty and Zucman (2013).
Notes: Europe is the (unweighted) average of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Private wealth 
is defi ned as the sum of nonfi nancial assets, fi nancial assets, minus fi nancial liabilities in the household 
and nonprofi t sectors.
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national income in 1910, and then fell after the World Wars to less than two and 
a half times in 1950. In the past 60 years, it has risen sharply to reach more than 
fi ve times national income. This pattern suggests that capital is “back” and that the 
low wealth–income ratios observed in Europe from the 1950s to the 1970s were 
an anomaly. This can be well accounted for by the long-run wealth accumulation 
formula β = s/g, where β is the Harrod–Domar–Solow wealth/income ratio, s is the 
saving rate, and g is the growth rate including both real per capita and population 
growth. For a given saving rate (say s = 10 percent), you accumulate a lot more 
wealth relative to income in the long run when the growth rate is 1.5 to 2 percent 
than if the growth rate is 2.5 to 3 percent. Given the large and continuing differ-
ence in population growth rates between Old Europe and the New World, this can 
explain not only the long-run changes but also the difference in levels between 
Europe and the United States (Piketty 2011; Piketty and Zucman 2013).8
On the other hand, it should be noted that wealth concentration (as opposed to 
wealth accumulation) is signifi cantly greater in the United States, where the top 
1 percent owns about 35 percent of aggregate wealth (for comparison, the share is 
about 20 –25 percent in Europe). So far, existing studies have found that the increase 
in US wealth concentration since the 1970s and 1980s has been relatively moderate 
in contrast to the huge increase in US income concentration documented above 
(Kennickell 2009; Kopczuk and Saez 2004). However, we should be modest about 
our ability to measure the trends in top billionaire wealth. With low and diminishing 
growth rates and high global returns to capital, the potential for divergence of the 
wealth distribution is naturally quite large.
Joint Distribution of Earned and Capital Income
We have discussed earned income and capital income. The last piece of the 
puzzle concerns the joint distribution of earned and capital incomes—an aspect that 
is rarely given explicit consideration. Yet it is important to know whether the same 
people are at the top of both the distribution of capital income and the distribution 
of earned income. Suppose that we imagine asking the population fi rst to line up 
along one side of a room in increasing order of their earned income and then to 
go to the other side of the room and line up in increasing order of their capital 
income. How much will they cross over? In the Ricardian class model, the crossing is 
complete: the capitalists come at the top in one case and at the bottom in the other. 
Has a negative correlation in the nineteenth century been replaced today by a zero 
correlation? Or is there a perfect correlation, so that people cross straight over? The 
pattern of crossing is given by the copula, which represents the joint distribution 
in terms of a function of the ranks in the two distributions of earnings and capital 
income. Because the copula compares ranks, it is not affected by whether the distri-
butions themselves are widening or narrowing.
8 In a way, this is equivalent to the explanation based upon lower bequest taste: with higher population 
growth and the same bequest taste (per children), the United States should save more. However a signifi cant 
part of US population growth historically comes from migration, so this interpretation is not fully accurate.
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What can be learned by considering the copula? Table 1 shows results for the 
United States in 2000 and in 1980 based on tax return data analysis from Aaberge, 
Atkinson, Königs, and Lakner (forthcoming). Three conclusions may be drawn. 
First, the joint distribution is asymmetric. In 2000, of those in the top 1 percent of 
capital income, 61 percent were in the top 20 percent of earned income. However, 
turning things round, of those in the top 1  percent of earned income, a larger 
proportion of 80  percent were in the top 20  percent of capital income. In fact, 
63 percent of the top 1 percent of earners were in the top 10 percent of capital 
income. Such asymmetry could easily be missed by the use of a measure such as 
the correlation coeffi cient or a parametric form for the copula function. Second, 
the degree of association appears strong. Even for capital income, over half of the 
top 1 percent fi nd themselves in the top tenth of earners. A quarter are in the top 
1 percent for both. Third, the numbers for 1980 are all smaller than their coun-
terparts for 2000. The degree of association increased between 1980 and 2000: in 
1980 only 17 percent were in the top 1 percent for both. The proportion of the top 
1 percent of earners who were in the top 5 percent of capital income rose from one-
third to one-half, and the reverse proportion rose from 27 to 45 percent.
Table 1
Relation between Top Labor Incomes and Top Capital 
Incomes in the United States
Year
1980 2000
A: Percent of top 1% capital incomes in various top labor income groups
Labor income groups:
 Top 1% 17% 27%
 Top 5% 27% 45%
 Top 10% 32% 52%
 Top 20% 38% 61%
B: Percent of top 1% labor incomes in various top capital income groups
Capital income groups:
 Top 1% 17% 27%
 Top 5% 36% 50%
 Top 10% 47% 63%
 Top 20% 68% 80%
Source: Aaberge, Atkinson, Königs, and Lakner (forthcoming).
Notes: Panel A reports the percent of top 1 percent capital income earners in 
various top labor income groups in 1980 (column 1) and 2000 (column 2). 
In 2000, 27 percent of top 1 percent capital income earners were also in the 
top 1 percent of labor incomes, 45 percent were in the top 5 percent of labor 
incomes, etc. Panel B reports the percent of top 1 percent labor income 
earners in various top capital income groups in 2000 (column 1) and 1980 
(column 2). The computations are based on the public use US tax return 
micro-datafi les (see Aaberge et al., forthcoming, for complete details).
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To understand the changing relationship between earned and capital incomes, 
we need to consider the mechanisms that link the two sources. In one direction, 
there is the accumulation of wealth out of earned income. Here the opportuni-
ties have changed in Anglo-Saxon countries. A third of a century ago, Kay and 
King (1980, p. 59) described the hypothetical position of a senior executive with 
a large corporation in the United Kingdom who had saved a quarter of his after-
tax earnings: “[F]eeling . . . that he has been unusually fortunate in his career and 
unusually thrifty . . . he may be somewhat surprised to discover that there are in 
Britain at least 100,000 people richer than he is.” Today, a chief executive offi cer 
may be both better paid and more able to accumulate. In the other direction, there 
is the effect of large family wealth on earnings. In the past, the link may have been 
negative, whereas today it may be socially unacceptable to live purely off unearned 
income. Wealth/family connections may provide access to high-paying employment 
(to assess this, it is necessary to investigate the cross-generation correlation of all 
income, not just earnings).
Conclusions
The rise in top income shares in the United States has been dramatic. In seeking 
explanations, however, it would be misleading to focus just on the doubling of the 
share of income going to the top 1  percent of the US distribution over the past 
40 years. We also have to account for the fact that a number of high-income coun-
tries have seen more modest or little increase in top shares. Hence, the explanation 
cannot rely solely on forces common to advanced countries, like the impact of new 
technologies and globalization on the supply and demand for skills. Moreover, the 
explanations have to accommodate the falls in top income shares earlier in the twen-
tieth century that characterize the countries discussed here.
In this paper, we have highlighted four main factors that have contributed to 
the growing income shares at the very top of the income distribution, noting that 
they may operate to differing extents in the United States and other countries, 
particularly in continental Europe. The fi rst is tax policy: top tax rates have moved in 
the opposite direction from top pre-tax income shares. The second factor is a richer 
view of the labor market, where we have contrasted the standard supply-side model 
with the alternative possibility that there may have been changes to bargaining 
power and greater individualization of pay. Tax cuts may have led managerial ener-
gies to be diverted to increasing their remuneration at the expense of enterprise 
growth and employment. The third factor is capital income. In Europe—but less 
so in the United States—private wealth (relative to national income) has followed a 
spectacular U-shaped path over time, and inherited wealth may be making a return, 
implying that inheritance and capital income taxation will become again central 
policy tools for curbing inequality. The fi nal, little-investigated, element is the 
correlation between earned income and capital income, which have become more 
closely associated in the United States.
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